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Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence in Civil
Cases: Could This Be the Path Out of the
Labyrinth of the Exclusionary Rule?
JUDGE RICHARD J. HANSCOM*
The use of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases has been the subject of
extensive debate since its inception. Although most efforts to modify the
rule have been deemed unworkable, the author proposes a modification
that is both workable and sensible. Modification would be accomplished
by legislation which admits the results of illegal searches by law enforce-
ment officers who acted in good faith, and, at the same time, provide fixed
monetary sanctions against the governmental agencies whose officers con-
ducted the search. The author proposes a good faith balancing test to de-
termine evidence admissibility and administrative type proceedings to
determine monetary sanctions, if any are necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule, which leapt to the forefront of California
law in 1955, has created an unprecedented explosion in trial and
appellate litigation.' The intricate refinements of the rule which
were derived from much of that litigation are not only baffling to
police agencies, but have led to an erosion of the public's confi-
dence in our legal system. 2
There are a myriad of decisions dealing with the admissibility
of evidence found during automobile searches. These decisions
distinguish between general searches of a car and its compart-
ments or subcompartments and between types of containers
found within these compartments, and the smell, opaqueness, or
* Judge, San Diego Municipal Court, 1972-1982. J.D., University of California,
Los Angeles, 1958. Chief District Attorney, San Diego County, 1970-72
1. In an introduction to the 1977 supplement to Witkin's treatise on evidence,
the authors wrote: "The material on illegally obtained evidence has grown so
large that its present size requires a physical separation from other evidentiary
topics. Accordingly, the supplementary matter for Chapter II has been printed in
this phamphlet ... " B. WTKIN & J. LEAVrir, CALIORNmA EVIDENCE (2d ed. ch. II
Supp. 1977).
2. Jensen, Exclusionary Rule: A Denial of Justice? L.A. Daily J., Oct. 13, 1981,
at 4, col 3.
tactile qualities of the container.3 Such distinctions are reminis-
cent of the ancient philosophers' endless debate about how many
angels could stand on the head of a pin. The endless refinements
in the law of search and seizure, along with a basic absence of
logic concerning the exclusionary rule, have provoked a number
of suggestions to modify the exclusionary rule, either through ju-
dicial reinterpretation or legislation.4
The fundamental distrust with the rule was best summed up by
Justice Cardozo, who noted "The criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered .... A room is searched against the
law, and the body of a murdered man is found .... The privacy
of the home has been infringed, and the murderer goes free
"•5
A further problem with the exclusionary rule is that it appears
to be aimed at the wrong target. It provides a windfall to the
guilty defendant when evidence has been seized illegally. At the
same time, it does not punish the wrongdoers, i.e., the erring law
enforcement officials, nor does it compensate an innocent citizen
who has been the subject of an illegal search which produced
nothing. He or she is left to the present inadequate civil suit for
damages.
The efforts to modify the exclusionary rule have been largely
3. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981); Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct.
2841 (1981); Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1976).
4. See note 2 supra. An exhaustive list of articles and cases are set out in
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449 n.21 (1976):
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure § SS290.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1975); Davidow, Criminal Proce-
dure Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal,
4 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 317 (1973); Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the
Police, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (1974); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Viola-
tions of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955); Geller, Enforcing
the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975
Wash U.L.Q. 621; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 1027 (1974); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Ex-
clusionary Rule-Part 11: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30
Mo. L. Rev. 566 (1965); McGowan, Rule Making and the Police, 70 Mich. L.
Rev. 659 (1972); Quinn, The Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of
Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. Urb. L 25 (1974); Roche, A Viable Substi-
tute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 223 (1973); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Ap-
p roaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the US Exclusionary Rule, 1 J.
Police Sci. & Ad. 36 (1973); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 243
(1973); Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief from Illegal Search, 1967
Wash. U. L.Q. 104; Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Un-
constitutional Police Conduct, 78 Yale L.J. 143 (1968); Comment, Use of
§ 1983 to Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards,
5 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 104 (1970).
5. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926).
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unsuccessful,6 and in California they have been totally unsuccess-
ful. However, an analysis of a little known line of California civil
cases which have developed over the past fifteen years may re-
veal a rationale which would allow a modification of the rule.
Modification might be accomplished by legislation which would
admit the results of illegal searches by law enforcement officers
acting in good faith, and at the same time, provide fixed, easily ap-
plied monetary sanctions against the governmental agencies
whose officers conducted the illegal searches. Administrative pro-
ceedings similar to workers' compensation actions could be set up
to administer the monetary sanctions. This approach would re-
quire the legislature to balance the seriousness of the police mis-
conduct against the deterrent value of the remedy devised in
order to ensure law enforcement compliance with the fourth
amendment 7 of the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution.8 In cases where law enforcement officers were
found to be acting in good faith, the legislature could provide
fixed civil sanctions, not subject to jury veto, which would be suffi-
cient deterrents to violations of the fourth amendment. In cases
where the law enforcement officers' conduct is not in good faith or
otherwise "shocks the conscience" 9 of the court, the remedy of
6. The one notable exception is the judicially declared "good faith" rule of
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), which is discussed at length
later in this article. See notes 72-76 infra and accompanying text.
7. See note 10 infra.
8. The provision of the California Constitution which parallels the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution is article one, § 13. All references in
this article to the California Constitution are to that section, unless otherwise
stated.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. Article one, § 13 of the California Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated;
and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized.
CAi. CONST., art. I, § 13. While those two provisions appear to be virtually identi-
cal, it is well established that the provision of the California Constitution is not
interpreted the same as the fourth amendment. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
9. See note 43 irnra.
exclusion of the illegally seized evidence would remain. Thus, it
is possible to devise a continuum of remedies to make the fourth
amendment and the California Constitution meaningful.
The rules of evidence generally favor the admission of relevant
and reliable evidence, no matter how it is obtained.o But, as Jus-
tice Blackmun pointed out when discussing the exclusionary rule,
"as is nearly always the case with the rule, concededly relevant
and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable."11 As will
be shown, California courts have indeed recognized the validity of
applying a balancing test to the exclusionary rule. This article
will examine the exclusionary rule in civil cases, both in Califor-
nia and other states, and will suggest a balancing test in place of
the exclusionary rule as it now stands.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL CASES OUTSME OF
CALIORNIA
The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states in
criminal cases by Mapp v. Ohio.12 Soon thereafter, the Supreme
Court, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,13 held that
the rule applied equally to civil proceedings brought by a state to
obtain a forfeiture of an automobile which had been seized be-
cause it contained contraband. That decision was based on the
fact that while the proceedings might be civil in form, they were
really criminal in nature. 14 California has followed this rule in
forfeiture cases.1 5 This reasoning is consistent with the civil cases
10. "The basic rule is that all competent, substantial, credible and relevant evi-
dence is to be available to the courts." Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44, 203
N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d, 83, 85 (1964).
11. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976).
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
14. Id. at 700.
[A) forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like
a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law .... It would be anamolous indeed, under these circum-
stances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evi-
dence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the
determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence
would be admissible.
Id. at 700-01.
15. People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1964).
The People also contend that, conceding the unlawfulness of the seizure,
the exclusionary rule should not be applied in a car-forfeiture case, as the
action is civil in nature. Whatever the label which may be attached to the
proceeding, it is apparent that the purpose of the forfeiture is deterrent in
nature and that there is a close identity to the aims and objectives of crim-
inal law enforcement.
Id. at 96, 396 P.2d at 709, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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in California requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
unanimous jury verdicts, such as mental competency or sexual
psychopathic hearings.16
Other applications of the exclusionary rule in civil cases have
not been as clear cut. Most of the decisions concerning searches
by non-law enforcement persons have upheld the admissibility of
illegally seized evidence in civil cases. The rationale for these de-
Cisions was that the exclusionary rule was not designed to deter
non-governmental trespassers or intruders. Thus, in Sackler v.
Sackler,17 a divorce action, the New York Court of Appeals up-
held, on two grounds, the admissibility of evidence illegally seized
by a private detective. The first ground was that the search was a
private search and not by a government agency, and second was
that the interests of justice would not be promoted by the exclu-
sion of convincing evidence.18
Similarly, other cases have upheld the admissibility of evidence
seized by non-government persons in automobile tort actions. For
example, in Walker v. Penner,19 the plaintiff was injured in an au-
tomobile accident, and he offered into evidence a whiskey bottle
taken by one of his companions from the defendant's car. That
evidence was held to have been properly admitted, even though it
was conceded that the seizure violated the fourth amendment.
On the other hand, the results have been divided regarding the
admissibility of blood alcohol tests in personal injury actions
where the blood was illegally seized by law enforcement
officials.20
The reasons advanced for the adoption of the exclusionary rule
are twofold. First, and increasingly foremost, is that by excluding
16. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1977); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); Peo-
ple v. Bunick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); People v. Bales,
38 Cal. App. 3d 354, 113 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1974).
17. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
18. Id. at 44, 203 N.E.2d at 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The court stressed that the
evidence was seized by private detectives and did not discuss the question of
whether or not state action is involved through the licensing of private detectives.
Cf. People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979); In re
Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d 125, 635 P.2d 446, 17 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1981) (both cases involv-
ing the rights of merchants with regard to observed shoplifters).
19. 190 Or. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951).
20. Compare Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1964)
(evidence admitted) with Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958)
(evidence excluded).
such evidence law enforcement officers will be deterred from vio-
lating the fourth amendment.2 1 While this premise is open to se-
rious question, it is firmly rooted in fourth amendment law. The
second reason advanced is the maintenance of judicial integrity.22
Simply stated, this means that the court should not soil its hands
with evidence tainted by a fourth amendment violation. The im-
portance of these bases cannot be overestimated. If the exclu-
sionary rule is "part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation,"23 as Justice Brennan has suggested, then no judicial
or legislative modification of the rule is possible.
Given the principal that the reason for the rule is the deterrent
effect, it follows logically that:
[T]he exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with
any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served. The balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed in
the contours of the standing requirement. 24
It has been persuasively argued that it is doubtful that any law
enforcement officer would ever be thinking about the possibility
of using illegally seized evidence in a civil case.25 On the other
21. "In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Indeed, Justice Blackmun has suggested that the "judicial in-
tegrity" factor, when properly analyzed, is very similar to the deterrent factor. See
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 n.35 (1976). "The basic purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement." People
v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446 P.2d 800, 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1968).
22. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658-59 (1961). See also People v. Taylor, 8 Cal.
3d 174, 179, 501 P.2d 918, 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353, (1972), wherein the California
Supreme Court said: "We recently reiterated that the twofold purpose of this rule
is 'to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitutional searches
and seizures by removing their incentive to do so, and to relieve the courts from
being compelled to participate in such illegal conduct."' A California appellate
court affirmed those purposes in Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549,
111 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726 (1974), when it stated: "The secondary purpose underlying
the exclusionary rule is to preserve the integrity of the judicial process by keeping
it free of the taint of the use therein of improperly obtained evidence."
23. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 651).
24. 414 U.S. at 348. Calandra approved the use of illegally seized evidence in
questioning a witness before the grand jury.
25. The California Appellate Court for the Second District noted that:
There is doubt, though, whether the first and primary reason for the rule
exists to any appreciable degree in civil cases. The police in making in-
vestigation of suspected criminal activity are, we surmise, generally com-
pletely unaware of any consequences of success in their investigative
efforts other than the subsequent criminal prosecution of the suspected
offender.
Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 726. "[T]he bun-
gling police officer is not likely to be halted by the thought that his unlawful con-
duct will prevent the termination of parole because the authority cannot consider
[Vol. 9: 799, 19821 Illegally Seized Evidence
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hand, the policy of preserving judicial integrity would be just as
important in a civil action as in a criminal case.26 Therefore,
when illegally seized evidence is admitted in a civil action, the
courts are balancing the policy favoring the exclusion of tainted
evidence to preserve judicial integrity against the public policy
underlying the particular law involved, such as divorce or per-
sonal injury. It is this balancing procedure that is significant
rather than the actual result in any individual case.
This was the precise analysis used by Justice Blackmun in
United States v. Janis,2 7 where the Court held that evidence ille-
galy seized by a state law enforcement officer was admissible in a
federal civil action involving the government as the plaintiff. In
Janis, police officers, acting under the authority of a search war-
rant valid on its face, seized bookmaking paraphernalia from the
defendant. Subsequent to the issuance of the warrant, the
Supreme Court decided the case of Spinelli v. United States.28
The defendant was prosecuted in the Los Angeles Municipal
Court, and he argued that the affidavit in support of the search
warrant did not meet the two-pronged probable cause test of
Spinelli.29 The judge who issued the warrant agreed and sup-
the evidence that he unlawfully procures." In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 649-50, 463
P.2d 734, 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1970).
In applying the exclusionary rules to attorney disciplinary proceedings we
find practically no deterrent effect upon any law enforcement officer who
might be tempted to use unconstitutional methods to obtain evidence for
use in a criminal trial. Here, as in the situation in Martinez the officer
might not even know that the suspect was an attorney and might not even
contemplate the consequences of an arrest or conviction upon profes-
sional disciplinary proceedings.
Emslie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 229, 520 P.2d 991, 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175, 186
(1974).
26. ' There can be no doubt but that the second aspect of the policy underlying
the exclusionary rule [i.e., judicial integrity, see note 24 supra] obtains in both
civil and criminal cases." Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 726.
27. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
28. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
29. In Spinelli the Court refined its test for establishing probable cause in or-
der to obtain a warrant. The original test had been previously articulated in Agul-
lar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In order to satisfy the Aguilar test and properly
issue a warrant based "on hearsay-an informant's report-what is necessary...
is one of two things: the informant must declare either (1) that he himself has
seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay,
but there is good reason for believing it." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
425 (1969) (White, J. concurring). The Spinelli Court extended the test by adding
the possibility that a warrant could be issued where the Aguilar test was insuffi-
cient if the facts sworn in the affidavit by the anonymous informer could be inde-
pressed the evidence. 30
On the basis of this evidence, the United States Internal Reve-
nue Service determined that the defendant owed almost $90,000 in
wagering taxes for his bookmaking activities. They made an as-
sessment of those taxes and seized $4,940 in cash, which had been
seized by the police pursuant to the invalid warrant. In upholding
the use of this illegally seized evidence in the federal tax proceed-
ings, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the deterrent effect
under these circumstances was slight. He then went on to apply
the balancing test in deterring the admissibility of the evidence.
His conclusion was:
If the exclusionary rule is the 'strong medicine' that its proponents claim
it to be, then its use in the situation in which it is now applied (resulting,
for example, in this case in frustration of the Los Angeles police officers'
good-faith duties as enforcers of the criminal laws) must be assumed to
be a substantial and efficient deterrent. Assuming this efficacy, the addi-
tional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a different sovereign
from using the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does not outweigh the
cost to society of extending the rule to that situation.
3 1
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CALIFORNIA CIVIL CASES
The development of the law in California concerning the admis-
sibility of illegally seized evidence in civil cases has been mostly
in the review of administrative proceedings concerning license
revocations in various professions. California first adopted the
exclusionary rule in 1955, in People v. Cahan.32 Soon thereafter,
the rule was extended to forfeiture proceedings, which were con-
sidered criminal proceedings for the purposes of the exclusionary
rule.3
3
Analogously, in People v. Moore,34 in a proceeding to civilly
commit a narcotic addict, the court held that even though the nar-
pendently corroborated. "The informer's report must first be measured against
Aguilar's standards so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is found
inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the informa-
tion contained in the hearsay report should then be considered." Id. at 415.
30. 428 U.S. at 437-38.
31. 428 U.S. at 453-54.
32. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
33. In People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 96-97, 396 P.2d 706, 709,
41 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1964), the California Supreme Court stated that:
The People also contend that, conceding the unlawfulness of the seizure,
the exclusionary rule should not be applied in a car-forfeiture case, as the
action is civil in nature. Whatever the label which may be attached to the
proceeding, it is apparent that the purpose of the forfeiture is deterrent in
nature and that there is a close identity to the aims and objectives of crim-
inal law enforcement. On policy the same exclusionary rules should apply
to improper state conduct whether the proceeding contemplates the depri-
vation of one's liberty or property.
See also note 15 and accompanying text supra.
34. 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968).
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cotic addict statutes are civil in nature, they have so many of the
features of a criminal case that "[w] hether any particular rule of
criminal practice should be applied in a narcotic addict commit-
ment proceeding depends upon consideration of the relationship
of the policy underlying the rule to the proceeding."35 The court
emphasized that the deterrent effect on law enforcement officials
would be enhanced by the exclusion of evidence in commitment
proceedings, even though such proceedings are, to some extent,
for the benefit of the addict. Narcotic addict proceedings "involve
a loss of liberty, and the proceedings are for the benefit of society
as well as the addict." 36 Therefore, the court held that the exclu-
sionary rule was applicable to such proceedings. 37
However, a similar analysis led to an opposite result in a case
involving the use of illegally obtained evidence in a parole revoca-
tion proceeding by the Adult Authority. In the case of In re Marti-
nez38 the California Supreme Court employed the same balancing
test but came to the conclusion that:
the social consequences of imposing the exclusionary rule upon the au-
thority can be disastrous. Conceivably, if the improperly obtained evi-
dence were the sole basis for parole revocation, the authority might find
itself unable to act in the case of the paroled murderer whom the police
improperly discovered had cached a minor armory for future use or the
paroled narcotics peddler who had collected a quantity of heroin for fu-
ture sale.39
The court pointed out that the deterrent effect of the rule is slight,
in that often the law enforcement officer does not even know the
person is a parolee and is very unlikely to consider the question
of admissibility in a parole revocation hearing when out on the
streets enforcing the law.4o The court also emphasized the bal-
ancing nature of this test when it pointed out that if the police
conduct "was so egregious as to offend 'the traditions and collec-
tive conscience of our people,'"41 then the result might be
different.
In the first case that involved considerations of the exclusionary
35. Id. at 681, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
36. Id. at 682, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
37. The fact that the end result of such proceedings resulted in the incarcera-
tion of the "patient" for substantial periods of time may well have been the most
significant factor in this case. Id.
38. 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970).
39. Id. at 650, 463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
40. Id.
41. Id. This is referring to the violation which shocks the conscience of the
court or is done in bad faith. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
rule in administrative proceedings to revoke a license, it was as-
sumed that the exclusionary rule would apply.42 However, in
Pierce v. Board of Nursing Etc. Registration,43 the court of appeal
for the fourth district cast some doubt on the application of the
exclusionary rule in a case involving proceedings to revoke the li-
cense of a nurse. The court noted there were important public
policy considerations involved when the licensing entailed the
healing art "where the welfare of sick and helpless persons de-
pends on his integrity, fidelity and skill."44 Thus, the need to bal-
ance the public policy and public good against the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule was alluded to, although the court went
on to hold the search legal and, therefore did not have to decide
the exclusionary rule application.
In Governing Board v. Metcalf,45 the appellate court considered
the exclusionary rule in detail. Metcalf concerned the use of evi-
dence of lewd acts by a school teacher in the restroom of a down-
town department store. The evidence was obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment and the California Constitution. After
carefully balancing the purposes of the exclusionary rule against
the public policy of protecting children and the educational pro-
cess, the court determined that the exclusionary rule should not
be applied. The court pointed out that it was doubtful that the
law enforcement officers would be deterred from violating the
fourth amendment by excluding the evidence from such a pro-
ceeding. The court reasoned that it would be very unlikely that
law enforcement officers would know who the particular person
involved was at the time of gathering the evidence or, even if they
did, would have any knowledge that such evidence would be used
in a license revocation administrative hearing.40 In addition, the
court emphasized the "many ways that children are entitled to
special protection."47 However, the court indicated that it might
42. "In view of the foregoing it will be assumed here that the exclusionary rule
will apply to an administrative hearing where the proceeding contemplates the
deprivation of a license which is recognized as a property right, as is the right to
practice medicine." Elder v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 260, 50
Cal. Rptr. 304, 315 (1966).
43. 255 Cal. App. 2d 463, 63 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967).
44. Id. at 466, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
45. 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974).
46. Id. at 549, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
47. The law has long recognized in many ways that children are entitled to
special protection. This is particularly true during the process and period of their
compulsory education. In this case Metcalf was with his sixth grade pupils of both
sexes generally from 8:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. each school day, and once or twice a week
in season, on his own, he helped transport children to and from games of football,
basketball and baseball. Children of the age of his pupils tend to idolize their
teachers. Although the restroom incident involving Metcalf became known only to
the district superintendent, his secretary and the principal of Metcalf's school, it
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not apply the same rule on "non-moral" grounds, thus intimating
that the nature of the interest to be protected is an important
consideration. 48
The Metcalf decision was shortly followed by Emslie v. State
Bar,49 a decision of the California Supreme Court which held that
the exclusionary rule did not apply to State Bar proceedings
which lead to the disbarment of an attorney. Emslie was arrested
in Las Vegas. While evidence was found which linked him with
numerous hotel room burglaries, criminal charges against him in
Nevada were eventually dismissed. The California Supreme
Court held that the evidence was legally seized, but also went on
to hold that such evidence, even if illegally seized, would be ad-
missible in such proceedings.SO The court again emphasized that
there would be almost no deterrent effect upon enforcement of-
ficers because they probably would not even know that there
would be professional disciplinary proceedings as a result of their
actions. The court stated that "a balancing test must be applied
in such proceedings and consideration must be given to the social
consequences of applying the exclusionary rules and to the effect
thereof on the integrity of the judicial process."5 ' However, the
decision was not a sweeping one which allowed the use of evi-
dence illegally seized under any circumstances in a license revo-
cation proceeding as the court specifically emphasized that rules
must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.52
was the principal's professional opinion that if the incident ever became known to
Metcalf's fellow teachers, his pupils or to parents of those pupils, Metcalf would
have been unable to function effectively thereafter as a teacher and his exemplar
image would have been destroyed. Id. at 550, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
48. Id. at 551, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 728. The court went on to state that: "Depriva-
tion of one's opportunity to follow one's profession in this state may be a much
more severe punishment for a criminal defense than anything the criminal law im-
poses." Id. at 551-52, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 728. This is the only case which seems to
recognize the fact that many times a criminal prosecution may actually have less
impact on a person than a civil or administrative proceeding.
49. 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974).
50. The fact that the court decided the issue in this case is somewhat unusual
in that ordinarily an appellate court will not decide an issue which is not neces-
sary to the decision of the case. The court obviously felt the importance of the
question required it to decide the issue. "While we have concluded from our in-
dependent review of the record that there was no unlawful search or seizure the
issue is of sufficient importance to require consideration here." Id. at 226, 520 P.2d
at 1000, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
51. Id. at 229, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
52. While we hold that the exclusionary rules are not part of administra-
tive due process in State Bar disciplinary proceedings we do not intimate
An interesting extension of this principle occurred in a recent
case in which evidence illegally seized by the police of one city
was used in disciplinary proceedings involving a police officer
from another city. The California Court of Appeals for the Second
District upheld the use of this evidence. The California Supreme
Court ordered the opinion depublished; so this question is still
left open.53
Two cases from a different area of the law have found the appel-
late court applying the same balancing test in reaching the result
that evidence illegally seized would not be excluded. In re Chris-
topher B.54 and In re Robert p.55 both involved proceedings to de-
clare a minor child a ward of the court because of an unfit home.
At issue was the admissibility of evidence, of the unfit nature of
the home, alleged to have been illegally seized. The evidence was
observations of, and photographs taken by, police officers of the
filthy and unkept nature of the home where the children lived.
This evidence was held to have been properly admitted. The
court balanced the deterrent effect of exclusion, which was found
to be slight, against the possibility that the extension of the rule
"might result in the suffering or deprivation of innocent chil-
dren."56 The court decided that the potential harm to the children
was too high a price to pay for the slight deterrent effect.5 7
The common factor in all of the above cases was that the police
conduct in each case was explicitly found to be in good faith and
did not "shock the conscience" of the court. Once such a finding
was made, the courts did not hesitate to apply a balancing test to
that circumstances could not be presented under which the constitutional
demands of due process could not countenance use of evidence obtained
by unlawful means in a proceeding conducted by such governmental
agency or administrative arm of this court. The application of such rules
must be worked out on a case-by-case basis in this and other license revo-
cation proceedings.
Id. at 229-30, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186. (probably referring to conduct
which "shocks the conscience").
53. Sattler v. City of Los Angeles, 121 Cal. App. 3d 511, 175 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1981).
Perhaps one of the problems in police disciplinary cases is that police officers are
probably well aware of the police disciplinary procedures and exclusion may well
have a much greater deterrent effect than is present in the other cases. On the
other hand, the public policy of having uncorruptable and law abiding police of-
ficers is substantial. A supreme court hearing was denied on October 22, 1981, and
the official reporter of decisions was directed not to publish this opinion in the Of-
ficial Reports, pursuant to Rule 976 of the California Rules of Court.
54. 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
55. 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976).
56. Id. at 321, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
57. Id. "Recognizing the special protection afforded children by the law, we
will not ignore the reliable evidence here presented and risk the welfare of the
children on the basis the evidence was the result of an unlawful and warrantless
search." Id. See also In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 615, 147 Cal. Rptr.
390, 394 (1978).
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determine the admissibility of the evidence. Using similar rea-
soning, California courts have held that illegally seized evidence
may be admitted in probation revocation hearings. While this
might appear to be an erosion of the rule excluding such evidence
in criminal cases, in reality it is not. Probation revocation hear-
ings are not considered criminal hearings per se, but are more
akin to administrative hearings, such as parole violation
hearings.5 8
In People v. Hayko,59 the first California case to decide this is-
sue, the defendant pled guilty to possession of illegal drugs and
was sentenced. Based on that conviction, the court revoked the
defendant's probation which had been granted in a previous case.
On appeal, the new conviction was reversed on the ground that a
motion to suppress had been erroneously denied, resulting in ille-
gally seized evidence being improperly used against the defend-
ant. The appellate court held that the reversal of the defendant's
new conviction did not take away the right of the judge to revoke
probation based on the illegally seized evidence. The court ruled
that in a probation revocation hearing the judge does not deter-
mine "whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of a crime.
Rather, he must determine whether the convicted offender 'can
be safely allowed to return to and remain in society.' "60
People v. Rafter6 also upheld the use of such illegally obtained
evidence in probation revocation proceedings. However, Rafter
went even further because it actually required the trial court to
consider such evidence at a probation revocation hearing. At the
revocation hearing, the superior court had excluded evidence of a
conviction in the federal court subsequent to the grant of proba-
tion. The federal conviction had been reversed on the sole ground
that it was a product of an unreasonable search. The appellate
58. However, the role of a judge in considering the question of whether a
convicted offender's probation should be revoked is analogous to the role
of the Adult Authority in determining whether a parolee's parole should
be revoked. The judge is not determining whether the defendant is guilty
or innocent of a crime. Rather, he must determine whether the convicted
offender 'can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society.'
People v. Hayko, 7 Cal. App. 3d 604, 610, 86 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730 (1970).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 41 Cal. App. 3d 557, 116 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1974). This case was decided after
the United States Supreme Court gave added procedural protections to defend-
ants facing parole and probation revocation proceedings. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
court ruled that the federal conviction should have been admitted,
reasoning that all relevant evidence should be considered in such
a hearing unless the police conduct involved would "shock the
conscience" 62 of the court.
In summary, the common theme in all of the cases mentioned
was that the good faith mistake of the officer and the remoteness
of the deterrent effect of exclusion of the illegally obtained evi-
dence were balanced against the importance of the societal inter-
est which was being litigated. If bad faith or shocking conduct
had been involved, the results as to the admissibility of the evi-
dence would have been different.
IV. LEGISLATION AND THE GOOD FAITH RULE-IS IT POSSIBLE TO
CHANGE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CALIFORNIA
THROUGH LEGISLATION?
A legislative response to the exclusionary rule is only possible
if the exclusionary rule is truly a judicially created answer or
sanction to enforce the fourth amendment and the California
Constitution. If exclusion itself is a constitutional right, the legis-
lature, and for that matter the courts, could not alter the rule in
any way.63 On the other hand, if it is not a constitutional right,
but rather a remedy to enforce the basic rights encompassed in
the fourth amendment, legislative and judicial interpretation is
possible.
The California Supreme Court, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, have made it clear that the rule is not a constitu-
tional right. They have repeatedly stated that the rule is to "deter
law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitutional
searches and seizures by removing their incentive to do so, and to
relieve the court from being compelled to participate in such ille-
gal conduct."64 Thus, the California Supreme Court has deline-
ated the rule in a manner which allows the legislature to act.
Any legislation would have to concern only "good faith" actions
by the police. The definition of a "good faith exception" has been
set forth in much detail by other commentators,65 but generally it
is thought to encompass two basic situations. The first is where
62. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 281. Any attempts to extend this
type of reasoning into a true criminal case have not been successful. For instance,
the use of a prior illegal arrest could not be used in the equation of probable cause
for a new arrest. People v. Maxwell, 78 Cal. App. 3d 124, 144 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1978).
63. See note 25 supra.
64. See note 24 supra.
65. For an excellent article on this subject see: E. Ball, Good Faith And The
Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, 69 J.
CRiM. L. & C. 635 (1978).
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"an officer may make a judgmental error concerning the existence
of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause."66 The second is
where "an officer may rely upon a statute which is later ruled un-
constitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated, or a court pre-
cedent which is later overruled."67 The latter violations would be
termed "technical violations."
The United States Supreme Court has considered the question
of good faith and the exclusionary rule in a number of cases. In
Peltier v. United States68 the Court considered good faith in rela-
tion to judicial integrity and deterrence. Although the case was
decided on retroactivity grounds the Court used the good faith
doctrine in its analysis.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed-
eral Narcotics Agents,69 argued at length that the Court could
change the exclusionary rule "if an effective remedy is provided
against the government."70 He went on to say that he would
"hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is devel-
oped."'71 Nevertheless, he felt that the rule was "both conception-
ally sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated
objective."72
Because the exclusionary rule is primarily based on its sup-
posed deterrent effect, its underpinnings are weakened unless
there is some showing that it actually deters illegal conduct of po-
lice officers. While studies have shown that the rule has probably
resulted in an increase in police education, which is certainly
laudable, 73 they have not shown that the rule actually deters law
enforcement officers from violating the fourth amendment. 74
66. Id. at 635.
67. Id. at 635, 636.
68. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
69. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
70. Id. at 414.
71. Id. at 415.
72. Id.
73. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-
Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391 (1965).
74. The most exhaustive collection of these studies is contained in United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 n.22 (1976), which reads:
The salient and most comprehensive study is that of Oaks, cited above in
n.20. Professor (now President) Oaks reviews at length the data in previ-
ous studies and the problems involved in drawing conclusions from that
data. The previous studies include, inter alia, D. Oaks & W. Lehman, A
Criminal Justice System and the Indigent: A Study of Chicago and Cook
County (1968); J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (1st ed. 1966); Goldstein,
The Chief Justice argued in Bivens that the response to unlaw-
ful police conduct should vary with the severity. He stated:
[F]reeing either a tiger or a mouse in the schoolroom is an illegal act, but
Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Deci-
sions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960); Kamisar, On
the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 Cornell
L.Q. 436 (1964); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some
"Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. Crim L.C. & P.S. 171 (1962); Kamisar, Wolf
and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (1959); Katz, The Supreme Court and the
States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina. The Model, the
Study and the Implications, 45 N.C.L. Rev 119 (1966); Kuh, supra, n.18;
Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965
Wis. L. Rev. 283; Paulsen, the Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Comment, Search and Seizure in
Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 493 (1952); Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of
Search and Seizure Practices, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 150 (1962); Younger, Is
Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure Dead?, 3 Trial 41 (Aug-
Sept 1967); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-
Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 87 (1968).
Oaks discusses the types of research that may be possible, and the diffi-
culties inherent in each. His final conclusion is straightforward:
"Writing just after the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, Francis A. Allen de-
clared that up to that time, 'no effective quantitative measure of the rule's
deterrent efficacy has been devised or applied.' [Allen, Federalism and
the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 34.]
That conclusion is not yet outdated. The foregoing findings represent the
largest fund of information yet assembled on the effect of the exclusionary
rule, but they obviously fall short of an empirical substantiation or refuta-
tion of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule." Oaks, s.upra n. 20, at
709.
More recently, Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. J.
681 (1974), discusses the data collected and reviewed by Oaks, and ex-
plores the difficulties in drawing conclusions from those data. The paper
also reviews studies that appeared subsequent to the Oaks article: Spi-
otto, supra, n.21, at 243, and two papers by Michael Ban, The Impact of
Mapp v. Ohio on Police Behavior (delivered at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Assn, Chicago, May 1973) and Local Courts v.
The Supreme Court: The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio (delivered at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Assn, New Orleans, Sept. 1973).
Canon describes his own research, but his data and conclusions appear to
suffer from many of the same difficulties and faults present in the prior
studies, many of which are explicitly recognized. Consequently, although
Canon argues in favor of retaining the exclusionary rule while Oaks ar-
gued against it, Canon's conclusions are no firmer than are Oaks': "Conse-
quently, our argument is negative rather than positive; we are maintaining
that the evidence from the 14 cities certainly does not support a conclu-
sion that the exclusionary rule had no impact upon arrests in search-and-
seizure type crimes in the years following its imposition." Canon, supra,
at 707. "Consequently, we cannot confidently attribute the increased use
of search warrants entirely or even primarily to police reaction to the ex-
clusionary rule." Id., at 713. See also id., at 724-725 and at 725-726. Canon
concedes that "the inconclusiveness of our findings is real enough," id. at
726, but argues that the exclusionary rule should be given time to take ef-
fect. "Only after a substantial amount of time has passed do trends of
changing behavior (if any) become apparent." Id., at 727. One might won-
der why, if the substantial amount of time necessary for the rule to take
effect is extremely relevant, the study fails to take into account the fact
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no rational person would suggest that these two acts should be punished
in the same way. . . . Society has at least as much right to expect ration-
ally graded responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital pun-
ishment' we inflict on all evidence when police error is shown in its
acquisition.
75
He advocated a legislative response, and his suggestion that there
should be a balancing test is in accord with the California cases
just reviewed.76
In United States v. Williams,77 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit recently adopted the good faith test
when it stated: "sitting en banc, we now hold that evidence is not
to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discov-
ered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are
authorized. '78 The court explained its reasoning with the follow-
ing language:
We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant
actions by police, not reasonable, good faith ones. Where the reason for
the rule ceases its application must cease also. The cost to society of ap-
plying the rule beyond the purpose it exists to serve are simply too high-
that over half the States have had an exclusionary rule for a significantly
greater length of time than Mapp has been on the books.
Most recently, Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United
States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 740 (1974), reviews the Oaks, Canon,
and Spiotto papers and the studies mentioned therein. The comment dis-
cusses the design difficulties present and involved in studying the deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule in general. Although a proponent of
the rule, the author concludes:
"A review of Spiotto's research and that conducted by others does not
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Rather, it tends
to illustrate the obstacles that stand in the way of any sound, empirical
evaluation of the rule. When all factors are considered, there is virtually
no likelihood that the Court is going to receive any 'relevant statistics'
which objectively measure the 'practical efficacy' of the exclusionary
rule." Id., at 763-764.
The final conclusion is clear. No empirical researcher, proponent or op-
ponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance
whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is
now applied. It is, of course, virtually impossible to study the marginal de-
terrence added to Mapp by the Elkins silver platter rule because of the
difficulty of controlling the effect of intersovereign exclusion.
We are aware of no study on the possible deterrent effect of excluding
evidence in a civil proceeding.
75. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76. "I see no insuperable obstacle to the elimination of the suppression doc-
trine if Congress would provide some meaningful and effective remedy against un-
lawful conduct by government officials." Id. at 421.
77. 622 F.2d 830 (1980).
78. Id. at 840.
in this instance the release on the public of a recidivist drug smuggler-
with a few or no offsetting benefits. We are not persuaded that both rea-
son and authority support this conclusion.
7 9
The basic assumption of the Williams ruling was that "a police of-
ficer will not be deterred from an illegal search if he does not
know that it is illegal."
80
There is a need for a response to violations of the fourth
amendment which is more finely graded than the exclusionary
rule. California has developed rules which allow such evidence in
civil proceedings when good faith of the officers is shown. If, as
has been suggested by Chief Justice Burger and others, addi-
tional sanctions are developed as a deterrent, the exclusionary
rule could be modified in California.
An approach could be set up which, like the present workers'
compensation proceeding, would take the civil remedy for an ille-
gal search out of the present court system. It is necessary to take
any civil remedy out of the present civil law because jurors are
notoriously reluctant to give monetary awards to persons who
have admittedly violated the law.
There is some validity to the claims that juries will not return verdicts
against individual officers except in those unusual cases where the viola-
tion has been flagrant or where the error has been complete, as in the ar-
rest of the wrong person or the search of the wrong house. There is
serious doubt, for example, that a drug peddler caught packaging his
wares will be able to arouse much sympathy in a jur on the ground that
the police officer did not announce his identity ....
A system of fixed awards to be given for various kinds of viola-
tions could be established. Such a proposal might take the form
of a $1,000 award given to any individual who is the victim of a
good faith illegal search of person or vehicle. For an illegal search
of a residence the individual would receive $2,000. If the search
were found to have been conducted without good faith or in a
manner that shocks the conscience of the court, then the awards
would be tripled. It would be desirable to allow the aggrieved
person to elect to bring an action in the civil courts, just as he can
now. That would allow the litigant to choose to pursue a larger
award or punitive damages for a particularly serious violation.
Thus, a rational monetary penalty against the governmental
agency, coupled with a finding of good faith on the part of the law
enforcement officer, would allow the use of illegally seized evi-
79. Id.
80. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 Thx. L
REv. 736, 740 (1972). While this argument has much validity, critics can say that
while it obviously will not deter the officer in the case before the court, it can deter
other officers in the future if they learn about the decision.
81. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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dence. In those cases where the acts of the officer shock the con-
science of the court or where there is not good faith, the evidence
would continue to be excluded. Such a system of sanctions would
probably have more deterrence value than the present exclusion-
ary rule. Anyone familiar with the response of local government
agencies to the imposition of fiscal penalties would know that this
might be a very meaningful remedy and local councilmen and
members of the board of supervisors are as extremely sensitive to
fiscal penalties. If there were a monetary sanction, there would
be more pressure on police chiefs and sheriffs to deter illegal
searches by their officers than there exists presently.
The basis for the exclusionary rule is theoretical at best. It as-
sumes that the officer really cares whether a case in which he
makes an arrest leads to a conviction. This assumption is doubt-
ful because usually the only "rewards" the officer gets is based on
the arrest itself and/or the seizure of contraband or stolen
goods.82 Monetary sanctions, which could certainly lead to inter-
nal disciplinary action, would be a much greater deterrent.
V. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that the present application of the exclusionary
rule satisfies anyone. Even the rule's proponents must concede
that the intricate complexities of the cases have rendered it diffi-
cult to administer. What started out as an apparently simple re-
sponse to a problem has turned into a quagmire swallowing up a
great amount of precious judicial time. When a rule does not
work well, it should be changed if a better solution can be found.
There is a better solution for dealing with illegally obtained evi-
dence than the exclusionary, rule in its present form. The follow-
ing summary could be a way to accommodate all the competing
interests.
1. Illegally seized evidence would not be excluded if it were
seized by officers acting in "good faith."
2. An independent agency would be given the power to award
fixed monetary awards to persons who were subjected to illegal
searches.
3. Such awards would be payable by the governmental agency
employing the law enforcement officer who conducted the search.
82. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHouT TRIAL 219-235 (2d ed., 1975).
4. The right to a jury trial in such proceedings would not be
available.
5. The present tort remedy in the civil courts would be avail-
able, but the plaintiff would have to elect either the regular civil
lawsuit or the administrative process.
6. If the search were not in "good faith" or one which "shocks
the conscience" of the court, the evidence would be excluded.
Based on the cases considering the rule in California, it appears
that the legislature could enact valid legislation, like that pro-
posed, which would alter the exclusionary rule. It appears that
one of the main reasons for adhering to the rule is because it is
the rule. As Justice Holmes said:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule sim-
ply persists from blind imitations of the past.83
Perhaps the time has come.
83. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
